diff --git a/readme.txt b/readme.txt
index 155342b..2bb8bbb 100644
--- a/readme.txt
+++ b/readme.txt
@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@ Hacker can get your private key if he will know a half of it (and pubkey.py, dec
 Check break.py to understand how hacker can do this.
 
 todo:
-1. left part of G is E, because we use Reed-Solomon algo; so left part of S @ G is S and cutting right colomns works; my_fix(G) returns E and in break_S we needn't get inv(G), just S = my_fix(G_ @ inv(P)), check it; try break_S with another (not Reed-Solomon) code (matrix G will be different; will my_fix(G) and my_fix(G_) return nonsingular matrices?; of course, rank(G) = rank(G_) = k and we can iterate through all possible combinations of column deletions and find one that does not lead to a nonsingular matrices); another way to get S is calculating it row by row (solving k systems, each has  n equations with k variables, k < n, but we need to do it in Galois Field)
-2. check randomization during encode (add vector z, check https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem)
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+1. left part of G is E, because we use Reed-Solomon algo; so left part of S @ G is S and cutting right colomns works; my_fix(G) returns E and in break_S we needn't get inv(G), just S = my_fix(G_ @ inv(P)), check it; try break_S with another (not Reed-Solomon) code (matrix G will be different; will my_fix(G) and my_fix(G_) return nonsingular matrices?; of course, rank(G) = rank(G_) = k and we can iterate through all possible combinations of column deletions and find one that does not lead to nonsingular matrices); another way to get S is calculating it row by row (solving k systems, each has  n equations with k variables, k < n, but we need to do it in Galois Field)
+2. check randomization during encode (add vector z, check https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem)
+3. make presentation that explains McEliece cryptosystem
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